ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

ing such an action, under the Bankrupt Act of 1867, is much
stror.ger. Th. Act of 181 merely provided, as the present act
provides, that the bankrupt's title to all his property should vest
in his assignee, with the right.to sue for the same: 5 U. S. Statutes at Large 442, 443. But the Bankrupt Act of 1867 goes a
step further, and, in the 14th section, declares that, "All the
property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors
0

* *

*

*

shall, in virtue of the adjudication of bankruptcy

and the appointment of his assignee, be at once vested in such
assignee."
Counsel for the defendant insist, however, that the 85th section
of the act modifies the language of the 14th section above cited,
and lfimits the right of action to set aside'fraudulent conveyances
to four, or, at most, six months. But I cannot assent to this construction.' I think the provision above cited from the i4th section
relates to the state statutes against fraudulent conveyanbes, and
to these only; and that the 85th section of the Bankrupt Act has'
n6 reference to those statutes, but is only intended to reach frauds
on the Bankrupt Act.. The two sections relate to different subjects; neither of them, therefore, can be construed as explaining,
modifying, or limiting the operation of the other.
Of the whole, I conclude that an assignee in bankruptcy may
maintain an action to get asiae fraudulept conveyances made by
the debtor before he is adjudged a bankrupt, and even before the
Bankrupt Act was passed, provided the person to whom the transfer was made was a party to the fraudulent intent, or received
the transfer without valuable consideration: and provided the
action is not barred by the Statute of Limitations.
The demurrer is overruled.
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COMMON CARRIERS.
Limitation of Liability.-A common carrier cannot limit his liability
by a memoranduni or note on the card or ticket which be delivers on the
t From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in Vol. 49 of his Reports.
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receipt of goods to be transported by him: Limburger v. Wcstcott' 49
Barb.
Thus, where, by a memorandum on a receipt for baggage, issued by
an express company, it was stated that the liability of the company was
",limited to $100, except by special agreement to be noted" thereon,
Reid, that in the absence of any knowledge by the owner of the baggage
of such condition, there was no consent to it by him, and no bargain
between the ,parties, limiting the liability of the company: Id.
CORPORATION.

Who are to be deemed Servants of.-A person employed by a manufacturing corporation as its civil engineer and travelling agent, at a fixed
si,
ary, is a servant of the corporation, within the meaning of the 18th
section of the Act of the legislature of 1848, which makes the stockholders of such corporations personally and individually liable for debts
due to their laborers, servants, and apprentices: Williamson v. Wadsworth, 49 Barb.
DAM.AGES.
For refusing to deliver Bonds bought.-In an action to recover damages for refusing to deliver bonds, alleged to have been bought by the
defendant as the plaintiff's agent, the plaintiff, to-prove tbd value of the
bonds, may show that they were -paid by the' company issuing them in
gold. He may Also prove what gold was worth, in currency, at that"
time:.Simpkins v. Low, 49 Barb.
It is erroneous to limit the plaintiff's recovery, in such an action, to
nominal damages, where there is proof that, the bonds were worth par,
in gold, a collateral security, and the evidence warrants the conclusion
that they were worth more than par, in currency: Id.
Such evidence should be submitted to the jury, and it should be 4eft
with them to assess the damages, free from any restriction. The Legal
Tendet Act, passed by Congress, is not to be construed as excluding
such evidence from the cofisiderition of the jury: Id.
It was not intended, by that act, to enable an agent, after having
received for a claim gold coin, to relieve himself from liability by payment in currency : Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

Memorandum in Writing.-The receipt by mail, by a purchaser, of a
bill of the goods purchased, containing the terms of sale, will not take
a parol contract of sale. out of the Statute of Frauds; -but either party
may repudiate such contract, at any time before tha actual receipt and
acceptance of the goods by the purchaser: Pike et al. v. Wieting et al.,
49 Barb.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Suits between.-At common law, a suit was maintainable, in equity,
by a wife against her husband, to recover money, the separate property
of the wife, which be had wrongfully taken and converted, and the Code
of Procedure having abolished the distinction between equitable actions
and actions at law, and the old forms of pleadings, a complaint setting
forth such a state of facts and praying judgment against the defendant
for the amount taken by him and converted to his own use, states a good
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cause of action, and is therefore not demurrable: Whitney v. Whitney,
49 Barb.
INJUNCTION.

To restrain proceedings in Courts of a sister State.-While, as a
general rule, the courts of this state decline to interfere by injunction,
to restrain its citizens from proceeding in an action which has been
tommenced in a court of a sister state, there are exceptions to this rule;
and when a case is presented, fairly constituting such exception, extreme
delicacy should not deter the court from controlling the conduct of a
party within its jurisdiction, to prevent oppression or fraud. No rule
of comity or policy forbids it: Vail et al. v. Knapp et al., 49 Barb.
MANDAMUS.

Discretion as to granting.-The court may exercise a discretionary
power as well in granting as in refusing a mandamus; as where the
end is merely a private right, and where the granting of it would be
attended with manifest hardships and difficulties. This discretion should
be exercised soundly, and in accordance with the peculiar circumstances
of the case: .The People ex rel. HacklIy et al. v. The Croton Agueduct
Board, 49 Barb. The defendants issued proposals for the building of a stone tower,
engine-house, &c. The relators were the lowest bidders for the work,
but the defendants refused to award the contract to them, or to any one
else,. for the alleged reason that no appropriation to cover the expense
existed; that they had changed the design and character of the work to
be done, and decided that the public interests requiied that the work
should be re-advertised and let under proposalg framed in accordane
with such alterations. Hfeld, that the issuing of the notice inviting pro.
posals did not alone and of itself bind the defendants to award the contract to the lowest bidder, or create any obligation; on their pa#t. to
award it at all. But that, if the bids were extravagant, or far beyond
the amount of the contemplated .expen'diture, they might, in their discretion, reject them altogether. And that, under the circumstances, it
would not be a proper exercise of judicial power to grant a mandamus
to compel the defendants to award the contract for the work in question
to the relators:
..
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Liability of Master to Servant for Negligence.-Ordinarily, an employer is not liable for injuries to one "of his employees occasioned' by
the negligence of another employee engaged in the same general business. Such employees, on entering the service, take upon themselves,
as an incident t6 the hiring, the ordinary risks and dangers arising
therein, which includes the negligence or carelessness of their fbllowservants: Faulkner v. The Erie Railway Company, 49 Barb.
.
No distinction arises from the different grades or ranks of the employees, nor from their being engaged in different kinds of work; provided the services tend to accomplish the same general purpose: Id.
An employer ig, however, responsible for injuries to employees arising
from his personal neglect, or from the want of ordinary care .and pre.
caution on his part in the selection of employee-s: Id.
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PRINCIPAl, AND AGENT.

-e4uthor~ty of a General Agent-particuZarinstructions.-If a general
agent has received particular instructions, which he disregards, his acts
as agent are, nevertheless, binding upon the principal. As between the
principal and a general agent, any deviation from particular instructions
will render the latter accountable to the former for any loss he may sustain in consequence of such deviation; but, as to third parties, who may
have dealt with the agent, any limitation of the authority, not communicated to them, will have no effect: Edwards v. Schaffer et al., 49
Barb.
P., who purchased of the plaintiff certain goods for the defendants,
was employed by the latter to transact their business in that brancti of
their commercial house situated in the city of New York. They had a
manufacturing establishmefit in Prussia; they transmitted a portion of
the goods there maiufactured to New York, which were sold there by
P., who was in the habit of purchasing goods for them there to be used'
in their manufactory in Prussia. P. published notices and wrote letters
in the defendants' name and style; and acted precisely as his principals
would have done had they been here. The firm-name of the defendants
was on the sign over the door of their place of business in New York;
and when payment for the goods was demanded,-P. wrote a note, signed
in the name of the firm, promising payment at an early day. Beld,
that this was sufficient to show that P. was the defendants' general agent,
acting tis their representative to do everything for them which the necessities of their business here required. And that in the absence of any
instrument expressly appointing him to do this, the facts showed an
.implied authority: Id.
Where principals accept, and pay for, a portion of the goods purchased
for them by their agent, they thereby dispense with any particular instructions directing that the whole shall be delivered at once. If they.
design to accept no more than the portion already delivered, they should
give early notice of that intent: Id..
RAILROAD COMPANIES.

Liability .for defective Bridges.-Where a railroad bridge was well
built, of good sound materials, upon a plan in common use, and the evidence as to its strength and capacity was abundant, and its sinking was
in no sense due to any defect in its original construction, but to a process
of natural decay called dry-rot; and the day before it fell it had been
inspected by the repairer of bridges and the division superintendent,
competent men, and examined, tested, and watched under the weight
of a train of cars : Held, that the company was not liable to the repre.
sentatives of an employee who was killed by the falling of the bridge,
either on the ground of a defect in its construction constituting negli.
gence or want of ordinary care, or by reason of the employment of incompetent, unskilful, or improper persons to examine the bridge: Faulkwer v. The Erie Railway Company, 49 Barb.
Held, also, that to render the company liable, on the latter ground, it
must affirmatively be made to appear that proper care was not used in
'he selection of its agents; and that by the exercise of proper care those
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Cagents would have been rejected as incompetent. The company is not a
guarantor of competency or fitness in its employees: Id.
ield,further, that the company was not responsible for the insuffiaiency of the bridge, in the absence of notice, unless the company was
ignorant of its condition through its negligence or want of proper
-are: Id.
Must acce'pt Legal Tender Arotes for Fares.-Under the Act of Congress approved February 25th 1862, authorizing the issue of United
States notes, and declaring that they shall "be lawful money and a
legal tender for all debts, public and private, within the United States,
except duties on imports," &c., a railroad company is bound to accept
United States notes issued in pursuance of that act, at the value expressed on the face of them, in payment of fares upon its railroad, when
demanded in advance of transportation on such road: Lewis v. The New
York Central Railroad Company, 49 Barb.
If -it exacts payment of the legal fare of a passenger, in advance, in
gold or silver coin of the United States, or tht market value of such
Loin in United States notes, it will be guilty of extortion, and liable to
the penalty imposed by the Act of the legislature of March 27th 1857,
for asking add receiving, a greater rate of fare than that allowed by
law: Id.
SHIPs AND VESSELS.

Attachments against.-Within the contemplation of the Act of the
Legislature of April 2d 1862, providing for the collection of demands
against ships and vessels, and other similar statutes, the place where the
services are in fact rendered, although they are rendered under and in
pursuance of a contract wade at another place,'is the place where the
debt is deemed to have been contracted: Mullin v. Hicks, 49 Barb.
Thus, where a contract was entered into at the city of New York,
between the plaintiff and the master of a vessel, by which the former
agreed to load the vessel with oak timber, for a specified sum; and'the
ship-then lying at Brooklyn-was afterwards moved to Weehawken,
in the state of New Jergey, where she was loaded by the plaintiff, under
and in*pursuance of the contract, it was held, that the snif due to -the
plaintiff, for-his services in loading the ship, was not a debt contracted
within the state of. New York, nor a subsisting lien upon the vessel, for
which an 'attachment could be issued under the statute : Id.
STAMAS.

O Chattel Mortqages.-The latter clause of the provision of the
Internal Revenue Act of the United States, authorizing the collector
to allow stamps to be affixed to mortgages, when they have been omitted
without intent to evade the provisions of tHat- act, or to defraud the
government, but declaiing that "no right acquired in good faith before
the stamping of such instruments * * * and the recording thereof, if
such record be required by law, shall in: any manner be affected by such
stamping," &c., does not apply to chattel mortgages. inasmuch as it contemplates mortgages which require to-be recorded : "Vailet al. v. Knapp
et al., 49 Barb.
Chattel mortgages are merely filed, and an entry made in a book kent*
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by the clerk, of the names of the parties, the amount secured, the date,
time of filing, and when due. This cannot be regarded, in any proper
sense, as recording a mortgage: Id.
The statute is highly penal, and should not, even in a doubtful case,
receive a construction which would invalidate the security: Id.
On Mortgages to secure Contingent Liabilities.-.-Under the provision
of Schedule "B" of the Revenue Act, specifying among the instruments
which require to be stamped "Mortgage of lands, estate, or property,
real or personal * * * where the same shall be made as a security for
the payment of any definite and certain sum of money lent at the time,
or previously due and owing, or forborne to be paid, being payable," no
stamp is necessary upon mortgages executed to secure the mortgagees as
drawers and indorsers of drafts drawn for the benefit of the mortgagors,
and payable subsequent to the execution of such mortgages, where no
money was lent at the time, nor had any become due and owing, nor
was any forborne to be paid, being payable: Id.
WILL.
Construction of-A testator devised to his wife and daughter, each,
the equal one-half part of his estate, real and personal, share and share
alike, subject to these restrictions, viz. : that each of the devisees was
vested wvith a power of testamentary disposition, unaffected by any trust
or limitation; but in. case of the death, intestate and without issue, of
either devisee, whatever might remain of the said property was devised
to the survivor. Reld, that each devisee might, during her lifetime.
dispose of the entire fee of the estate devised to her, for her own benefit; and that, the devisees having united in a conveyance to a purchaser
of the premises, with covenants of warranty, such conveyance passed
all the title of 'the grantors, either vested or contingent; that such title
was good, and the purchase was in equity bound to accept it: Freeborn'
et al. v. Wagner, 49 Barb.
Publication.-To constitute a valid publication, of a will or codicil,
the testator must, in the presence of two witnesses, declare the instrument to be his last will and testament, or a codicil thereto. If the
proof fails to establish such a declaration, to- one of the subscribing
witnesses, the instrument should not be admitted to probate: Abbeoy v.
Christy, 49 Barb.
Where one of the attesting witnesses testified that on entering the
testator's room, the latter, taking a paper out of his portfolio, desired
the witness to read it, which he did, silently; after which the testator
reque.sted him to witness his signature; in answer to a question put-by
the witness, whether he had read the paper produced, the testator said
he bad heard it read; and being asked if it was all right, he replied,
"I think so ;" and the other witness testified that when they entered
the room the testator remarked that he wanted them to "witness his
signature;" that they then put their names to the paper as witnesses.
but that nothing was said as to "what the paper was, or anything about
it;" that the witness never read it, and did not know what it was.
Held, that this was not a sufficient publication: Id.

